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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner
Case No.

v.
DAVID R. WARDEN,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the decision of the Court of Appeals in this

matter in conflict with earlier decisions of the Court of
Appeals, namely, State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (1989), holding
that the existence of contrary evidence or of conflicting
inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict.

See

also Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1987),
2.

Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is in

conflict with the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, namely,
State v. Gardner. 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1989), holding
that "...where there is any evidence, including reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all
the elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt,
our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict."
also State v. McClain. 706 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah 1985).
1

See

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Warden,
122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42,

P.2d

Appendix A to this petition.

(Ct. App. 1989), appears as

A copy of that court's order

denying the State's petition for rehearing appears as Appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The lower court's opinion was filed on November 22, 1989
(Appendix A ) . On January 29, 1990, an order denying the State's
petition for rehearing was issued (Appendix B). The State's
petition for rehearing tolled the period in which this petition
for certiorari had to be filed, R. Utah S. Ct. 45(c); therefore,
the petition is timely filed.

This court has jurisdiction to

review the decision of the Court of Appeals by a writ of
certiorari under UTAH CODE ANN. 78-2-2(5) (Supp.1986).
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES INVOLVED
1.

UTAH CODE ANN. Section 76-2-103(4)
Definition of "criminal negligence or criminally
negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
*

*

*

(4) With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the
result of his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's standpoint.

2

2.

UTAH CODE ANN. Section 76-5-206
Negligent homicide.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if
the actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes
the death of another.
(2)

Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent
Homicide, a class A misdemeanor, under UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-206
(1973).

The defendant was was initially tried by jury in the

Second Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning on November
16, 1987; however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18,
1987 due to improper testimony given by one of the State's
witnesses.

A second jury trial was held beginning February 22,

1988, which continued through February 26, 1988.

Defendant was

convicted of the offense of Negligent Homicide as charged.
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the
conviction should be reversed on the basis of insufficiency of
the evidence, based upon the State's failure to establish a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death."
The State's petition for rehearing was denied without
comment (Appendix B ) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RULING OF THIS PANEL OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF OTHER
PANELS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THAT IT
WEIGHED EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT
WHICH WAS CONTROVERTED BY OTHER COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
3

The Court of Appeals opinion properly cites State v.
Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (Utah 1989) as a standard for review, but
fails to recognize the rule regarding conflicting evidence:
Although contrary evidence was presented,
"(t)he existence of contradictory evidence or
conflicting inferences does not warrant
disturbing the jury's verdict." Tolman at 424,
425.
That rule has been consistently recognized by other
panels of the Court of Appeals. See Steele v. Breinholt. supra,
at 436; State v. Arrovo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The Court of Appeals opinion, in reversing on the issue
of sufficiency of the evidence, summarized the evidence in five
paragraphs.

Nearly all of the evidence relied upon by the court

was contradicted in the evidence presented.

Those five

paragraphs are reproduced below along with examples of the
contradictory testimony:
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION

EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

Defendant testified at trial
that the grandparents weighed
the
newborn
baby
and
determined it to be about five
pounds.
Defendant
also said
he believed the baby to be two
to three weeks premature.

Dr. Sweeney, State
Medical
Examiner:
A: 1.86 kilograms, 2,2 pounds
per kilogram off the top of my
head that would be about four
pounds, but I don't have a
calculator.
The
Court:
I
get 4.092
working it out here at the
bench.
The witness: So it would be
about four pounds one ounce,
approximately.
T.Vol.Ill, p.15
Dr.
Sweeney, State Medical
Examiner:
Q:
Did
you
come
to
a
conclusion as to how long it
had been in the uterus prior
to birth?

A: I «tii'lies What was that conclusion?
A:
That it was consistent
with approximately 33 to 34
weeks with 40 normally being
the number that I s used for
full term.
T.Vol.Ill, p. 7
Dr• Kramer, State # s
Pediatrician:
Q:
When
you
d :i d
that
measurement, what conclusi on
did you come to?
A: Based on weight, hei gh t
and head circumference, the
baby was 33 or 3 4 weeks of
gestation, which means
the
baby was probably six to seven
weeks early.
Defendant was aware that the
baby
was having
"grunting
reparations," which he said
was
a
sign
of
early
respiratory distress syndrome.
Defendant
positioned the
baby in such a way that the
labored
breathing
was
relieved.

Dr. < Q:
Is it possible to adjust
the position of the baby so as
to eliminate
the
grunting
sound?
A:
Yes,
And
tha t's
irrelevant to me because the
baby could be face down and
the noise could be muffled.
There's many ways that we can
change the noise coming out.
That's not relevant to me.
Q:
Does the changing of the
noise change the exertion of
the baby?
A: No,
Q:
Does
it
change
the
progress of the disease?
A: No,
Q:
Does
it
have
any
physiologic effect whatsoever
with regard to the disease?
A: No,
T i fn] I I

He £i irther testified
the
severity
of
respiratory distress did
indicate
a
need
hospitalization.
He said that he informed

Dr, Kraiic? i;
Qi
Now, in tins particul ar
case, I tiiiriJi you recognized
that the baby was born at the
home of the Youngs and then
after the birth of the baby

that
the
not
for
Ivy

that the baby was premature
and had difficulty breathing,
but that the baby was then
stable.

was left at the home of the
Youngs for a time?
A: That's what I was told.
Q: And I understand that you
feel
that
that
is
inappropriate because the baby
should have been placed in the
hospital?
That's
your
conclusion?
As That's my opinion.
T. Vol.11, pp.289-290

instructed Ivy to call
him if there was any change
and
admitted that
he was
depending on Ivy to carefully

Ivy Young:
A: He told me to watch the
baby through the night.
Q: He said watch the baby
through the night?
A: (witness nods)
Q: Anything else?
A:
No.
He didn't tell me
what to watch for.
He just
said to watch the baby.
Q: Did he say anything to you
if
any problem
arose
or
anything of this sort?
A: No.
Q: Didn't say, "Call me if
there's a problem."?
A: No.
T. Vol. I, pp.85-86

Before leaving
the Young
residence, defendant noted the
respiratory
difficulty
had
subsided.
He stated, "The baby was
respiring well, the baby was
still awake and alert
and
muscle tone was still good."
He
also
said,
"I was
impressed that the baby had
already shown some signs of
respiratory distress syndrome,
but
under
similar
circumstances in the past, I
have left babies at
home,
having instructed the mother
on
how to
nurse,
having
instructed the mother to keep
the baby warm and therefore I
felt I could leave, confident
that grandma would call m£,
confident that if there were
any progression of symptoms

Dr. Chan
A: A baby who is born at 33,
34
weeks
gestation
at
approximately
four pounds,
which I think is less than two
kilos, 2,000 grams —
Q: yes.
A:
—would
certainly
be
admitted
to
a
newborn
intensive care unit.
that
baby is at high risk for, one,
developing
respiratory
problems, such
as
hyaline
membrane
disease,
second,
metabolic problems like low
sugar,
electrolyte problems
and also anemia or infection.
T. Vol.Ill, pp.239-240

He

Ivy Young:
Q: All right.
Now, at that
time (just as the Dr. left)
did you note the breathing?

tha 1: I would be called.
Defendant later testified
that of 300 home births he had
attended, approximately ten of
those
babies
had
been
premature.
Eight
of those
had no
repiratory
distress,
but
defendant said that he had
hospitalized
onl y three of
those eight.
In the case of this infant,
defendant testified that f,in
my experience and the judgment
that 1 applied at the time
based
on
experience
with
babies who are even smaller
that this delivered at home,
they can in many cases get
along very, very well..."

A: It still stayed the same.
It was the same noise then the
baby would quit the noise and
kind of rest for a while.
Q:
So what you heard was a
grunting sound and then it
seemed like it would rest for
a while?
A: Yes,
Q: Could you detect in those
rest periods whether or not
the baby was breathing?
A:
He seemed to be. It was
just kind of a very short
period, Each time I checked
that he was okay and I turned
him to the other side and then
he'd start grunting again,
Q: How often would he
this grunting sound?
A:
He was just making trie
grunting sound all the i-^«T Vol 1, p.88
Dr. Kramer, Sta t€ s
Pediatrician:
A: I'm not sure whether Dr.
Warden had the confidence of
the parents to
watch this
baby,
1 # m not
sure
what
happened, but I bel ieve, if 1
can explain this, 1 believe
that parents or grandparents
are not i n the position to
evaluate a baby's situation
where the baby
is, in mj
opinion, premature.
T.Vol.II, p.293

The State's expert medical
witness
testified
that
although the mother and baby
"would
dc
better"
in
a
hospital,
defendant's
evaluation
of the infant's
well being would indicate that
the baby's vital signs were
"acceptable " '

Dr chan:
Q: Would the high Apgar score
to you indicate that it is not
a high ri sk baby?
AI No.
Q: Would that baby still be,
in your opj ni on,, a high risk
baby?
I : Yes.
T '
255
Dr. Kramer:
Q: My previous question was
couched in terms of otherwise

healthy.
Changing
that
hypothetical just somewhat to
say that the child had those
same physical dimensions but
had an acceptable eight, nine,
or ten Apgar score, would that
child be considered a healthy
child?
A: No.
T.Vol.II, pp.278,279
They
conceded
that the
infant may have survived had
he been hospitalized up to ten
hours
after
birth,
but
believed that leaving the baby
at home was "bad judgment" on
defendant's part.
The
State's neonatologist
testified
that
hyaline
membrane
disease
is
a
progressive disease.
He also indicated that a
baby in the condition of the
deceased is typically "at high
risk for medical and surgical
problems."
As far as mortality for an
infant
with
the
disease,
however, he stated that the
failure to provide
therapy
would
only
place
the
probability of death at five
to fifteen percent.
He later stated upon cross
examination that statistically
only two percent of babies die
from
untreated
hyaline
membrane disease.
He further said, "I guess
the message
is it's
very
unusual and rare to lose a
baby at this gestation and
this birth weight from hyaline
membrane disease."
Asked whether it would be
outside the medical standard
of care to have the family of
a home delivered newborn to
monitor any changes in the
baby's
condition,
the
neonatologist believed it was,

Dr. Kramer:
Q: Can you comment on the
probability
of saving
the
child at 8 o'clock?
A: I don't know, the earlier
the better.
T.Vol.II, pp.307-308
Dr. Chan:
Q: With that scenario where
the
baby was
about
four
pounds, 33 to 34 weeks in
gestation,
about ten hours
old, blue and with a lowered
heart rate and respiration,
would you expect to be able to
save the baby?
A:
I would hope so, but I
would have my doubts.
T. Vol.Ill, p.247
Dr. Chan:
Q:
How
much
would
the
probability of life for that
child be decreased
by the
failure to provide therapy?
A: Failure to provide therapy
for a baby at 33, 34 weeks
gestation who has developed
hyaline membrane disease, I
think
your
extent
of
mortality,
instead of less
than one percent, you move
into
five,
ten,
fifteen
percent.
T.Vol.Ill, p.250

but
conceded
that
competent
physicians
dl sagree wi th him,

other
would

The
State's experts
testified
that t h e medical
c o m m u n i t y in this state does
not teach or train physicians
for
home
delivery
and
generally recommends against
it.

DL . "'• 11«=*11:
A : That's to
approach
to
me
problem
because it does occur and I
think
home
deliveries are
appropriate
in
many
circumstances.
T. Vol.111, p,266

The court misapprehend • I I li

\A a t eiiieiiil

I I li i i J 11 i

regarding t h e '•statistic" that only t w o percent of babies d i e of
u n t r e a t e d hyaline membrane disease,
it could b e — i t doesn't m a t t e r w h e r e it i s , 1
suggest
The bottom, line is that the child is
untreated; therefore, if y o u h a v e hyaline
m e m b r a n e f 33 to 34 weeks and it's untreated
percent, two-out of a hundred may die?
A. We're not talking apples and o r a n g e s #
If the baby is in the hospital and it's —
see, there's no study where you say this baby
will be treated and this baby will not be
treated. I'm giving you the statistics of all
babies in the hospital being watched and
there's some babies you watch carefully and
they don't need any treatment, don't require
any treatment, and those babies -- and if you
say yes, if you're looking at those babies
that are not treated, very few of them will
die. (T.Vol.III, p.260)
It would be both unethical and inhumane to do a study in
a

host.iitdil

i i i iiillliii li ip.it i P i i l ^

I'^llii ,ih i t i iiin'i 'lyioniptoms

therapy a r e divided nttu two qioups:
and o n e which will n o t ,
WPM

f u r pill iiiPiil'

requiring

mi which will be treated

T h e statistics quoted b y the witness

nhi i

op i JI L on of the i r physic i anb

"ml if n
i I l i I-"" ni iii"111" mi that

. hcrrapy w a s not required»

t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , very few will d i e .

in f hi-"

Under

Further, on re-direct the witness clarified his
position:
Q: Now, we've had some talk about
percentages and it's a little bit confusing,
so I just want to recap a bit. From the point
of view of the doctor, leaving the home 30
minutes after the birth of the baby, given the
factors that the baby is 33 to 34 weeks in
gestation, that it's four pounds, that it's
got some blueness in its extremities and that
it's making the grunting sounds, what can you
say about that baby?
A. That baby had respiratory distress
syndrome. That baby is having respiratory
problems. That baby is sick.
Q. All right. Now, do you say anything
with regard to the probability of its dying
from that disease if it's untreated or left in
the care of a lay person?
A. I think to leave a baby with hyaline
membrane disease with a lay person just
creates increased problems of mortality for
that baby, morbidity.
Q. Can you give us any kind of a
quantitative objective basis that we can
develop as to what the degree of risk there is
for that baby left in the care of a lay
person?
A. It is very high. You could say 10,
2 0 - 2 0 times higher when left to a lay person
to manage the baby (T.Vol.Ill, p.278-279).
In any event, the determination of criminal negligence
should not be established by percentages of morbidity.

It is to

be determined by a subjective standard rather than an objective
standard. State v. Ruben. 663 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983).
The Court cites caselaw dealing with "bad judgment" by a
physician. State v. Warden, supra. at 45. The case now before
this Court is factually more consistent with the Montana case of
State v. Hoffman. 639 P.2d 567 (Montana 1982), where a mother was
found guilty of negligent homicide for failure to provide medical
10

I'• -i"

f, r t»a t H I P ' > i

i ' 11

treatment

is aeajt. v;:n

100 A.L.R,2d 483

''

"i'11*-• ^ n i l «*-»'" i

111 i in " i""« i" i

ir. Horni ide- ..,^ck of Medical Attention,

(1965)-

nor authorized to provide u -

treatment wnioh *ould have ^ V P C

this infant's 1 ife, h i ^ 1utv m r ^ e r.i,,(-0^
pares

[' i"'j v j (.11,-1 m e e t 1 t ; a i

- « s e m b l e s that

t a

<»i" cif h e r per soi I '« :i t::l:i a coi itr ac tuaJ duty «::>f c a r e i(l tr = n n f" 11d t,

of a physician fully qualified and authorized to treat.
A reasonable jury con] d have concluded that an i n c r e a s e c i
]

in e s :i s a s u b s t a n t i a 1 r i s k,
POINT II.
THE RULING Ok' THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN
CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT IN THAT THE COURT LOOKED BEYOND THE
EVIDENCE MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY VERDICT.
A y a 111,

ii, e v i e w i n q

t n e o p i n i o i"

" i: 111 e t: a u r t o t App e a 1 s,

the court cites evidence favorable to the defendant.

The Utah)

Supreme Court has consistently ruled thai ti'io standard for review
of .1 jury vetdi* "I

is I n h ul'

I I he e< idence favorable to the

jury verdict to test it's sufficiency.
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
crediblIity of the witnesses...." State v.
Lamm. 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) ; accord
State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1364 # 1366 (Utah
1983). "
So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences from which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. State
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 at 345 (Utah 1 9 8 5 ) .
See also, State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep.
3, 10 (Utah 1989), State v. McClain. 706 P.2d
603, 607 (Utah ] 9 8 5 ) •

The Court of Appeals7 opinion indicates that it failed
to adhere to that standard in the instant case:
Thus, reasonable minds could examine the
evidence presented and entertain a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted. Warden, at p. 45.
(emphasis added)
That statement is clearly not the standard established
by the cases cited.

Under the established standard, the court

should only overturn the conviction if "...reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443, 444 (Utah 1983).
The court further misapplied the standard of review in
its assessment of the evidence:
This response merely reinforces our conclusion
that his testimony, as well as that of the
other experts for the State, must be construed
in light of the fact that home delivery,
though legal, is not a widespread practice by
doctors in Utah. Warden, at p. 45. (emphasis
added).
By making that conclusion, the court has removed from
the jury the function of assessing the weight of the evidence.
To establish criminal negligence, it is
necessary to show conduct which is %a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.'...It is therefore a subjective
element requiring consideration of all
relevant circumstances surrounding the
incident. State v. Ruben, supra.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Bolsinger
699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), that a jury could take into account
several factors in evaluating conduct:

In N e i t z e l , supra, the court enumerated four
determining factors a jury should be asked
when it evaluates conduct resulting in death
and alleged to be depraved indifference: (1)
the utility of the defendant's conduct, (2)
the magnitude of the r:i sk, (3) the defendant's
knowledge of the risk, (4) any precautions
taken by the defendant to minimize the risk.
Bolsinger at 1220, referring to Neitzel v.
State, 655 P,?^ "*" 'Alaska App 198?*
The jury was entitled to assess each of the above
facr i

1 at i r

detenc.i

;... .,

, v*

,.^H**^ .

* M S

|i:.

. ,o«, . ^uvuld not reverse

r

the jury's eonclusi or:- I:,<OL^
sarr .

i - <-.

*

finds there 1,-

?"" • idence to

-. re] U S [ »-»r
... . .<~rt.*

.

1 S

undisputed that the family requested a home delivery and that
there is some social iitill ty to the practice nf home birth

The

question is what social utility was there in Ipdwin<| J a ret h Vuung
in his diseased condition to t ti«j care of Ivy V'oung, an
Vhe

inexperienced lay person
t e sr

i :i-

111

Ivy

it www
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|ury was entitled to acrppt the
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instructions as to what to watch for and that Ivy Young asked the
defendant
f L l l * Ut-

i* the victim ouqht not be hospitalized,
:

| nil

I i.

JUPSt

I (HI

I III

III

1 I I I V

I 'I

!•"•

The iutv

t » 'I H J L I J I I I " «

f

1 I I II

to diligently attend his patients before dtid rillni delivery,
The jury should further be able to assess the social
uti 1 Ity ui pi act ic i nq hum-" ' ' * " "4 J:

,J

,!

" '

malpractice insurance and not being authorized *
2

MAGNITUDE OF THF U ^

can best be assessed Iby t.

i- /» J*
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" mi i i nil ri i n 11
I ; : L ' patients
,.<= the risk
. deatn

increased by defendant's decision to leave the victim in the care
of the grandmother, Ivy Young.

Dr. Chan testified that so doing

increased the probability of death ten to twenty times.
The single most important factor in determining the
nature and magnitude of the risk is the fact that Hyaline
Membrane Disease is a progressive disease.

That is, given all

infants of this gestational age who contract the disease, five to
fifteen percent can be expected to die without medical
intervention.
progresses.

The probability of death increases as the disease

The experts agreed that as medical intervention

became necessary, time became an increasingly important factor.
3:

THE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK.

Defendant

acknowledged on the witness stand that he had diagnosed the
disease, that he was aware that it was progressive in nature and
that it was potentially fatal (T.Vol.IV, p.176).

He had even

made the determination that the baby would be better off in the
hospital (T.Vol.IV, p.174).

Sharon Johnson asked Defendant if

the child shouldn't be hospitalized but he told her it wouldn't
be necessary (T.Vol.IV, p.126).
4.
RISK.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO MINIMIZE THE

Emphasis has been placed by both the State and the

Defendant upon the decision to leave the victim in the care of
the grandmother, a lay person.

That act alone, however, is not

the only act for which Defendant should be held accountable.
Consideration should be given to the immediate prenatal care or
lack thereof, and the total absence of a reasonable course of
14

to 1 1 ow-np (vi t (i a f 1' pr I It*1 h i r t h

"

the .'ourt stated:
The standard of care to be applied in
this case is that which is applicable to a
physician practicing general medicine in
connection with the pregnancy, labor, deli^er^
and aftercare of a mother and newborn i-if-i
in the circumstances of this case. (P
• ^
53)
Tin-1 l)e fendait) I IViib'il I in i rt i m i /<» I lie m isks Midt existed
early in the day prior to delivery.

He failed In minimize the

risks at thp f ^ me of delivery and t-hpn a H e r diagnosing the
i nil m n 1.1111 AV the

disease

a"; I lie <J isease

progressed..
POINT III,
T H E R E

IS

S U F F I C I E N T

E V I D E N C E

T 0

S H 0 W

A

SUBSTANTIAL AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK OF DEATH BY
VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE VERDICT,
The standard that should have been appl ied by the Court
of Appeals ]^ enunciates «.- State v. BMG Corporation. 700 p.2d
1 -••

•

--.ah i n B ' V ) i

To mount a successful attack on the trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must
marshal1 all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then demonstrate
that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings.
BMG Corp., at 1070.
Marshalling the evidence

.is case i n the light most

favorable to the jury verdict, the following inferences can be
drawn:
1

Oefeadapt- v*«- » 1 icensed p h y s i c i a n w h o h a d

maintained -* family p r a c t i c e since 1 9 6 8 , including obstetrical
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2.

Defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's

physical well-being by agreeing to deliver it at home;
3.

Defendant did not insist on examining the mother

when she reported vaginal bleeding to determine if premature
birth was likely;
4.

Defendant knew that the established due date was

several weeks off, yet he failed to personally attend the
patient, a fact the defendant admitted on the witness stand was
an error in judgment (T.Vol.IV, pp.153,163);
5.

Defendant knew that the local practice was not to

have babies delivered at the local hospital if the gestation
period is less than 35 weeks, but rather to deliver in a more
specialized hospital (T.Vol.II, p.281);
6.

Defendant could have minimized the risk of premature

birth by Tocolysis (T.Vol.Ill, p.179);
7.

The practice of referring a mother in premature

labor to a hospital for Tocolysis is within the standard of care
for physicians practicing home births and for this doctor
personally (T.Vol.IV, p.131);
8.

Defendant could have slowed the onset of labor by

methods available in a homebirth setting (T.Vol.IV, p.131);
9.

Defendant could then have had the baby delivered in

a hospital setting, as would have been his own normal practice
even under these conditions, since he would not normally deliver
a premature baby in a home (T.Vol.IV, p.149);
10. Defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as having
Respiratory Distress Syndrome and had actual knowledge of the
16

risk of death posed by the disease, that it was progressive in
nature, the techniques available for monitoring the progress of
the disease by electronic equipment, and the treatments available
in Class III hospital neonatal units (T.Vol.IV, pp.175-178);
11.

Defendant could have immediately hospitalized the

baby, but did not;
12.

Defendant could have remained longer in the home

himself, but did not;
13.

Defendant could have arranged for a nurse or other

trained professional to monitor the progress of the disease, but
did not;
14.

Defendant could have provided Ivy Young with a

specific list of symptoms with an objective standard for
observation, but did not;
15.

Defendant could have provided Ivy Young with a

protocol for action more thorough than to just call him;
16.

Defendant advised the family to position the baby

in a way which relieved the symptoms but would not alleviate the
condition itself, but would rather mask the indicators of the
progress of the disease;
17.

Defendant minimized the seriousness of the infant's

condition to both Sharon and Ivy, and never advised anyone that
the child could die from the disease (T.Vol.IV, p.132);
18.

The practice of hospitalizing an infant with the

disease was within the standards of the defendant's practice and,
indeed, he had hospitalized three of eight children he had
delivered at home with the disease (T.Vol.IV, p.132);
17

19.

The defendant was not authorized to hospitalize

this infant because he had no malpractice insurance, so would
have to call another physician or have the infant admitted
through an emergency room facility, which would cause him some
embarrassment (T.Vol.IV, pp.121-122,124,126,127);
20.

Defendant left the infant in the care of a lay

person, the grandmother, with instructions only to watch the
infant through the night, without any specific instructions as to
what to watch for (T.Vol.I, p.86);
21.

Defendant consistently, from the early stages of

labor through the time he left the child, assured the family that
the conditions they were concerned about were normal, that
hospitalization was unnecessary, and that Ivy should "stop
fussing" (T.Vol.I, p.66; Vol.Ill, p.93,94,102) ;
22.

Defendant knew that the disease was progressive and

that the probability of survival decreased as the disease
progressed, yet he failed to call on the Youngs until noon the
next day (T.Vol.IV, p.Ill);
23.

The defendant lives less than five blocks from the

Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p.162).

His office is six to eight

blocks from the Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p.158).

He had ample

opportunity to visit or call upon the Youngs, but did not;
24.

At approximately six and a half hours after the

birth, defendant was awake, reading National Geographic
(T.Vol.IV, p.105);
25.

Defendant remained at home for some time before

leaving to play racquetball at a club which did not open until
eight and a half hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.105);
18

26.

Had the defendant called on the Youngs at that

time, he would have learned that Jareth was continuing in the
grunting sounds and had an abnormal color (T.Vol.I, p.91);
27.

Defendant returned from racquetball to his office

approximately ten hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.107).

Had

he checked with the Youngs at that time, the defendant would have
learned that the baby had, at one time, stopped breathing
(T.Vol.I, p.94) and that Ivy Young was trying to contact him;
28.

A layperson could not be expected to recognize the

subtle changes in the progress of the disease (T.Vol.Ill,
pp.272,273);
29.

Jareth Young died from Respiratory Distress

Syndrome (T.Vol.Ill, p.13);
30.

By leaving the child in the care of laypersons, the

risk of death increased 10 to 20 times - from less than one
percent to up to fifteen percent (T.Vol.Ill, pp.278,279); and
31.

The death was preventable by hospitalization within

a 99% degree of certainty, a fact known to the defendant
(T.Vol.Ill, p.248).
These inferences are sufficient to sustain the verdict
of the jury.

Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has found the

evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of criminal negligence
in death cases involving less probability of death.

See

State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980), wherein the court
found sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of negligent
homicide where defendant, acting as an accomplice, bent down a
19

stop sign so it was not visible from the lane of travel; also,
State v, McPhee. 684 P.2d 57 (Utah 1984), where the evidence in
an automobile homicide consisted of evidence of drinking, a state
of intoxication so as to cause staggering and slurred speech and
evidence of crossing three lanes of travel into the wrong lane of
an intersecting street.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State's petition
for writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted this ^£*

day of February, 1990,

ME^VIN Cj. WILSON
D a v i s Coainty A t t o r n e y

BRIAN J J NAMBA
Deputy/Davis County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Darwin C,
Hansen, Attorney for Defendant, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City UT
84101, this

day of February, 1990.
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CODE•CO
122 Utah Adv. * » • *2
case, however, we believe the issue of prejudice evaluated her for home delivery, considering
relative to the gun custody issue was sufficiently tpe risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of
hospital facilities, and the availability of
problematic to merit analysis.
S. For example, defendant claims his counsel should
family support to care for the infant and
have argued he was incompetent to stand trial or pother after birth. Defendant determined that
lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent to Joanne's pregnancy was low risk and that
commit the crimes. Testimony at defendant's sent- medical facilities were nearby. He also learned
encing hearing, however, by Dr. Alma Carlisle, a
tjiat Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the
Utah State Prison psychologist, negated those theories. Exclusion of the theories was, therefore, a primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy had
given birth at home to four of her seven chillegitimate trial strategy.
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dren. Based on -this evaluation, defendant
decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate
ft>r home delivery and agreed to attend the
birth. He also made arrangements to obtain
Gteat
Joanne's medical records from her previous
122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42
doctor, and on the basis of that information
IN THE
apd his own examination, calculated her delivery date to be in early December.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
On the morning of November 7, Joanne
STATE of Utah,
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy called
Plaintiff and Respondent,
defendant, who was in Salt Lake City at the
v.
tjme. Defendant expressed concern that labor
David R. WARDEN, Jr., M.D.,
was beginning and advised Ivy to confine
Defendant and Appellant
joanne to bed and to contact him immediately
if the bleeding became heavier or if strong
No. W0S75-CA
contractions began. That afternoon, Ivy called
FILED: November 22,198*
defendant again and told him that the bleeding
b*d stopped. She also told him that she had
Second Circuit, Layton Department
spoken with the father of the child and that he
Honorable K. R o w Bean
had told her that conception had occurred*
month earlier than originally believed. Defe*
ATTORNEYS:
ndant testified that this information led him to
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for Appellant
think that the labor was not premature, and
Mdvin C. Wilsoaand Brian J. Namba,
he advised her to call again as labor contiParmington, for Respondent
nued. Ivy did so that evening, repenting that
joanne was having occasional contractions.
Before Judaea Bench. Greenwood, and
Defendant told her to call back when thai
Bullock
contractions were three to five minutes apart.
At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy informed defendant
OPINION
that the final stage of labor had begun. DefBENCH, Jadge:
endant arrived at the house fifteen minutes
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of lgter.
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breecn mrtn
negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, in
to
* male infant which appeared to be healthy,
violation <tt Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206
but weighed only an estimated four to five
(1978). We reverse the conviction,
pounds. The baby exhibited some respiratory
FACTS
distress which defendant attributed to premaDefendant David R/Warden, Jr., is a lice- turity. Defendant testified that he suggested
nsed and board-certified physician who hospitalization of the infant to Ivy, bat that
began practicing family medkinc in Kaysvflk, Ivy was concerned because there was no health
Utah, in 1968. As part of his practice, defen- insurance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied
dant provides obstetrical care, and estimates that she ever discussed with defendant hospithat he has attended approximately 2500 talization of the infant) Defendant instructed
births, 300 of which have been home delive- ivy how to position the infant to relieve some"
ries.
of the respiratory distress and showed Joanne
In September 1986, defendant was visited far bow to nurse the baby. He also instructed Ivy
his office by Joanne Young, who consulted tp keep the child warm and to monitor the
defendant because she was pregnant out-of- baby's temperature, color, and brouhing*
wedlock and wanted to have her baby at After instructing Ivy to call him if there were
home. Joanne testified that she was embarra- any changes in the baby's condition, defenssed about her pregnancy and 'didn't want to dant left at about 11 ;30 p.m.
have to go to the hospital and have people
During the night. Ivy moved Joanne and the
know/ She also expressed a desire to keep the baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed that tin
expenses of birth to a minimum. Defendant child's hands and feet were 'very blue/ bui
did not call defendant. At 8:00 a.m., the babj
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy attempted to resuscitate him for about twenty
minutes, and apparently the infant responded.
She thai called defendant's office, but was
told he was at home. When Ivy called defendant's home, his wife advised her he was not
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 a.m.
In neither call did she identify herself, leave a
message, nor report that there was any emergency. She apparently was aware defendant
was not inaccessible in such a situation, but
did not make further attempts to reach him.
She did not take the infant to the hospital or
notify emergency services. She testified that in
England, her native home, "you would have
had to have g doctor's permission to have
called an ambulance."
At about 8:30 *JXL, Ivy called a friend but
did not tell her that the child was having difficulty breathing. She also called her clergyman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or
10:00 a.m. that the baby was having respiratory difficulty. The clergyman called a local
pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home
at about 10:30 a,m. only to find the infant
'lifeless.* The baby was taken to a hospital,
but was pronounced dead shortly after arrival.
A postmortem examination revealed that the
infant was born approximately six to seven
weeks premature and had died from respiratory distress caused by prematurity of the
lungs (hyaline membrane disease). Defendant
subsequently was charged with one count of
negligent homicide.
An initial jury trial ended In a mistrial prior
to the rendition of a verdict. A second jury
trial was held February 22-26, 1988, and
defendant was convicted as charged. Defendant's motions to arrest judgment and for a
new trial were denied.
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(14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must
be of such a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah
Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1978). Consequently, negligent homicide involves a defendant's perception of risk and necessarily requires an evaluation of his or her state of mind.
State v. Wessendorf, Til P.2d 523, 525-26
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Whether a defendant
negligently fails to perceive the risk is a question of fact for the jury. See State v. Howard,
597 P.2d 878, 881 .(Utah 1979). However, the
risk of death "must be of such a degree that
an ordinary person would not ... fail to recognize i t / State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148
(Utah 1983).
Because the "failure to perceive die risk
constitutes a ajoss deviation from the reasonable man standard," ordinary negligence
adequate in the civil law is insufficient to
constitute criminal negligence. State y*
Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 1979); see
also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267; 2 C. Tofda,
Wharton's Criminal Law §168 (terms such at
"criminal negligence" are intended to connote
deviations from reasonableness significantly
greater in degree than ordinary negligence).
Thus, "(mlere inattention or mistake in judgment resulting even in death of another is noi
criminal unless the quality of the act makes Mt
so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d
433,8CaLRptr.863.868(1960).

EXPERT TESTIMONY
Defendant contends thai expert testimony
was required in this case to establish the
"standard of care," but that the State's
medical experts were not qualified to testify.
On the other hand, the State argues that
ISSUES
Defendant raises essentially two issues on expert medical testimony was not required,
appeal, arguing, for a reversal of his convic- and that it needed only to present 'competent'
tion. He first claims that the State's expert evidence to show the nature and degree of risk
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the and the circumstances as viewed from the
applicable,medical standard of care. Second, actor's standpoint." The State correctly obshe argues that there was insufficient evidence erves that the "standard of care* in section 76to establish that his conduct deviated signifi- 2-103(4) refers to the actor's mental state, i s
cantly from the applicable standard of care opposed to medical malpractice cases in which
and that there was a causal connection expert medical testunony is required to show
between his conduct and the baby's death.
the applicable standard of medical care. See,
e.g., Chadwkk y. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
(Utah C t App. 1988), It is also true that
Conduct constituting the crime of negligent
expert testimony i$ not required to prove the
homicide occurs when an 'actor, acting with
mental state of a criminal defendant accused
criminal negligence, causes the death of
of homidde. See State v. Nicholson. 585 P.2d
another.' Utah Code Ann. $76-5-206(1)
60,63 (Utah 1978).
(1978). The culpable mental state for criminal
We conclude, however, that expert testinegligence requires 'only that a defendant
mony was required in this case since such
'ought to be aware of a substantial and unjtestimony was necessary to establish the nature
ustifiable risk' of death.* StMte v. Standiford,
and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1)
769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah
requires the State to prove beyond a reason*
Code Aim. §76-2-103(4) (1978)); see also 1
able doubt that defendant's judgment was
C Torda, Wharton's Criminal Law §168
criminally deficient because he failed to percliTAH AnVlNTV MPrtBTfi
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eive a substantial risk that death could occur. | a reasonable doubt. To convict a person of
Without an understanding of the nature and violating section 76-5-206(1), the State must
degree of risk, the jury could not determine establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both
whether the risk was substantial, and if so, prohibited conduct and a qulpable mental
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was state. To establish a culpable mental state, the
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one within prosecution must present evidence that defethe common knowledge and experience of ndant was unaware of a substantial and unjlaypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could ustifiable risk of death, but should have been
make an informed determination of culpabi- so aware.
We review defendant's claim under a stanlity.2 We believe that expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is alleged and dard that does not permit us to substitute our
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the judgment for that of the jury in a criminal
ken of the average layperson. See, e.g., trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424
Ketchum v. Ward, All F. Supp. 934 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Rather,
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State's, use of expert
we review the evidence and all infmedical testimony at trial supplied sufficient
erences which may reasonably be
evidence of criminal negligence for negligent
drawn from it in the light most
homicide conviction iri death of mother on
favorable to the verdict of the jury.
whom physician had performed legal aborWe reverse a jury conviction for
tion).
insufficient evidence only when the
Defendant argues that the State's expert
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
medical witnesses did not qualify as experts
inconclusive or inherently improbbecause they do not attend home deliveries.
able that reasonable minds must
The witnesses included two obstetrician/
have entertained a reasonable doubt
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatolthat the defendant committed the
ogist. Citing the medical malpractice case of
crime of which he was convicted.
Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
(Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of 1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,
medicine is not competent to testify as an 444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Hopkins,
expert against the practitioner of another 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 59,60 (1989).
school), defendant argues that the State's
Defendant testified at trial that the granddoctors were not qualified to testify because
parents
weighed the newborn baby and detethey were of a different school of medicine I
tiinff defendant*
I rmined it to be about five pounds. Defendant
also said he believed the baby to be two to
The qualification of an expert witness it a
three weeks premature. Defendant was aware
matter within the sound discretion of the trial
that the baby was having 'grunting respiratcourt. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421
i o n s / which he said was a sign of early resp(Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record
iratory distress syndrome. Defendant positithat there is no board certification or recognoned the baby in such a way that the labored
ized medical specialty in home delivery. There
breathing was relieved. He further testified
was also evidence that the medical principles
that the severity of the respiratory distress did
applicable to the delivery of babies are applinot indicate a need for hospitalization. He
cable whether a birth occurs at home or in a
said that he informed Ivy that the baby waa
hospital. In view of the record evidence, the
premature and had difficulty in breathing, but
trial court was within its discretion to qualify
that the baby was then stable. He instructed
the State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf. \
Ivy to call him if there was any change and
Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and
admitted that he was depending on Ivy to
procedures of general plastic surgeon were
carefully watch the infant Before leaving the
shown to be identical to those of specialized
Young residence, defendant noted that the
plastic surgeon, one may testify against the
respiratory difficulty had subsided. He stated,
other); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., I
"The baby was respiring well, the baby waa
711 P J d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) (nothing precstffl awake and alert and muscle tone was still
ludes testimony from expert in another trade if I
g o o d / He also said,
the standard is the same for. both). 'The critI was impressed that the baby had
ical factor in determining the competency of I
already shown some signs of respian expert is whether that expert has knowledge I
ratory distress syndrome, but under
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving-the I
similar circumstances in the past, t
issues before i t ' Id. at 253; see also/Qtah R.
have left babies at bome^ having
Evid. 702. We conclude that the trial court I
instructed the mother'on how. to
committed no abuse of discretion in allowing [
nurse, having instructed the mother
the State's experts to testify.
f
to keep the baby warm and thereSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
fore I felt I could leave, confident
Defendant claims that the evidence presethat grandma would call me, confnted was insufficient to establish guilt beyond
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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ident that if there were any progression of symptoms that I would be
called.
Defendant later testified that of 300 home
births he had attended, approximately ten of
those babies had been premature. Eight of
those had had respiratory distress, but defendant said that he had hospitalized only three
of those eight. In the case of this infant, defendant testified that "in my experience and the
judgment that I applied at the time based on
experience with babies who are even smaller
than this delivered at home, they can in many
cases get along very, very well.... •
The State's expert medical witnesses testified that although the mother and baby
"would do better" in a hospital, defendant's
evaluation of the infant's well-being would
indicate that the baby's vital signs were
"acceptable." They conceded that the infant
may have survived had he been hospitalized up
to ten hours after birth, but believed that
leaving the baby at home was "bad judgment"
on defendant's part.1
The State's neonatologist testified that
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive
disease. He also indicated that a baby in the
condition of the deceased is typically "at high
risk for medical and surgical problems." As
far as mortality for an infant with the disease,
however, he stated that the failure to provide
therapy would only place the probability of
death at Ave to fifteen percent. He later stated
upon cross-examination that statistically only
two percent of babies die from untreated
hyaline membrane disease. He further said, "I
guess the message is it's very unusual and rare
to lose a baby at this gestation and this birth
weight from hyaline membrane disease."
Asked whether it would be outside the
medical standard of care to have the family of
a home-delivered newborn to monitor any
changes in the baby's condition, the neonatologist believed it was, but conceded that
other * competent physicians would disagree
with him. This response merely reinforces our
conclusion that his testimony, as well 4k that
of the other experts for the State, must be
construed in light of the fact that home delivery, though legal, is not a widespread practice by doctors in Utah. The State's experts
testified that the medical community in this
state does not teach or train physicians for
home delivery and generally recommends
against it.
We are convinced that even looking at the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently inconclusive" to establish that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death such that
defendant should have been aware of it. Thus,
reasonable minds could examine the evidence
presented and entertain "a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of
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which he was convicted." See Booker, 709
P.2dat345.
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to
establish criminal negligence, we need not
reach the issue whether defendant's acts or
omissions were the legal cause of death.
Defendant's conviction is reversed.
Russell W. Bench. Judge
I CONCUR:
J, Robert Bullock, Judge
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78.3-2400 (Supp. 1989).
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., 'the actor's
viewpoint,9 which need not be accepted by the court
and which is ultimately a determination for the jury.
3. Our research has revealed very few cases In which
licensed physicians have been charged with negligent
homicide. In many of those cases where such a
charge has been brought, albeit under differing
statutes, the courts have held thru no criminal liability attaches when death results from an error of
judgment. See gencnOy Annotation* Homicide
Predated on Improper Treatment of Disease or
Injury, 45 AJLRJd 114(1972).
GREENWOOD, Judge: ( c o m n i a g a r t
dissenting}
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion concerning expert testimony, but dissent from the
opinion's conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's conviction
of negligent homicide/ The majority opinion
correctly states the necessary quantum of evidence for negligent homicide as being where
the defendant should have been aware of a
substantial and unjustified risk of death, but
was not. State v. Wcssotdorf, 77? P*2d 523,
525 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Also, the risk must
be such that an ordinary person would not,
cfisregard or fail to recognize it. State r.Dyer,
67! P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). Therefore, in
this case, the State was required to convince
the jury that there was a substantial and unjustified risk that the Infant would die if he did
not receive medical care in a hospital-type
setting; that defendant was unaware that the
risk existed; and that an ordinary person in
defendant's position would have recognized
that risk. Our task as an appellate court, is to
determine if the evidence presented, when
viewed favorably to the jury verdict, *is sufficiently inconclusive or Inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant commit
tied the crime of which he was convicted/ State
v. Booker, 109 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985) (quoting State v. Peine. €59 PM 443.
444(1983)),
My assessment of the evidence supporting
the jury verdict IB as foUowt: defendant was a
licensed physician who had maintained a
family practice since 1968, including obstetr-

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

46

State v. Warden

ical care; defendant assumed responsibility for
the infant's physical well-being by agreeing
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist
on examining the mother when she reported
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature
birth was likely or if so, what precautions
should be taken to minimize the likelihood of
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the
infant after birth as having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant in a way which relieved the
symptoms but would not allevihte the condition itself; defendant minimised the seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy and
Joanne; three of the ten children he had delivered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant
could die from the disease and that the disease
was progressive; defendant could not himself
admit the infant into a hospital because he
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have
to call another physician or have the infant
admitted through an emergency room facility;
Ivy testified that defendant only told her to
watch the infant for changes in his temperature, color and respiration, without advising
her as to the degree of change which might
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or
Joanne that death could result from the
disease; and defendant left the infant in the
care of laypersons.
There was other, conflicting evidence which
would indicate that defendant should not have
been aware that a substantial risk existed.
However, the existence of conflicting evidence,
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury
verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 42425 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The jury has been
through the arduous task of listening to and
assessing the evidence presented in this most
difficult case, and I do not think that we
should appropriately substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was
based on what defendant knew or the jury
believed he knew at the time, and its assessment that given that knowledge he should
have known the risks. I do not find the evidence 'sufficiently inconclusive/ as do my
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would
conclude that the record, while heatedly controverted, contains sufficient evidence for the
jury to conclude that defendant should, have
been aware that a substantial and unjustified
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant
of negligent homicide as a result.
Pamela T. Greenwood* Judge
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Before Judges Bench, Billings, and
Greenwood. tpOPINION
BILLINGS, lodge:
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. ("Regional')
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it
$792.18 in damages as a result of crossappellant Roland Reichert's ("Mr. Reichert*)
breach of a non-competition agreement with
Regional, his former employer. Regional also
appeals the trial court's reduction of its attorney fees which Regional claims were provided
for by the parties' written contract and reasonably incurred in prosecuting this action.
Mr. Reichert cross-appeals the court's
denial of his attempt to amend his counterclaim to add a claim for unpaid commissions
and salary. We reverse and remand in. part,
and affirm in part.
Singe the late 1950s, Edward and Helen
Kiholm have operated a small family business
which acted as a manufacturer's representative
in designated territories of the mountain west.
The business earned commissions from its
principal manufacturers by selling their goods
to retailers.
In 1977, the Kiholms hired Mr. Reichert as
an independent contractor to handle outside
sales. If the relationship was satisfactory, the
Kiholms intended to retire in ten years with
Mr. Reichert taking over the business* Mr.
Reichert worked for the Kiholms until 1978
when the business was incorporated as Regional.
In 1979, Mr. Reichert entered into a written
employment contract with Regional. The
employment contract contains a non-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

State of Utah,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Respondent/
Case No. 880575-CA

v.
David R. Warden, Jr., M.D.,
Defendant and Appellant,

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Petition for
Rehearing be denied•
Dated this j ^ 2 _ T 3 a y of January 1990.

FOR THE COURT:

bonan, Clerk

